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WILLISTON AS CONSERVATIVE-PRAGMATIST
Mark L. Movsesian*
In her pathbreaking article, "Restatement and Reform: A New
Perspective on the Origins of the American Law Institute,"' Professor N.E.H.
Hull rejects the conventional wisdom about the conservative, even reactionary,
character of the First Restatements. The truth, she argues, is more subtle. The
Restatements, and the larger AL project of which they were a part, reflect the
"'progressive-pragmatic"' worldview of the law professors most responsible
for their creation.2 These professors-men like William Draper Lewis, Arthur
Corbin, and Wesley Hohfeld-were reformers. They rejected the formalism of
earlier generations; for them, law was not a conceptual system but a practical
tool for promoting beneficial social goals. They tempered their zeal for
change, however, with an appreciation of political realities. For example, they
understood the need to include older scholars like Joseph Beale and Samuel
Williston in the Restatement project in order to give the work credibility with
the established bar. Their strategic compromises help explain the "unsteady
equilibrium" between conservatism and reform that characterizes their ultimate
product.'
Professor Hull unfortunately leaves one element of the received wisdom
unchallenged. She accepts the conventional notion of Williston, the Reporter
on the Restatement of Contracts, as an anti-reform conceptualist whom
progressives had to mollify in order to advance their agenda.4 In fact,
Williston shared the progressives' distaste for conceptual rigidity and
championed the Restatement's greatest doctrinal innovation. He favored
formalism for its practical advantages, but he did not object to gradual reforms
that could make commercial law more just and predictable. He distrusted
some of the progressives' scholarship, but he did not entirely discount it; for
example, he asked Corbin to keep an eye out for Hohfeldian issues in drafting
the Restatement. 5 In Hull's terms, Williston was a "conservative-pragmatist."
* Frederick A. Whitney Professor of Contract Law, St. John's. My comments here are taken
substantially from my previously published article, Rediscovering Williston, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
207 (2005).
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Far from opposing the reformers, he actually helped them to achieve some of
their goals. A . ... 1-
I discuss Williston's jurisprudence-his beliefs that law must be justified
in terms of real-world effect, that rules can have only presumptive force, and
that one can best understand judicial restraint as a matter of institutional
competence-at length elsewhere.6 Time does not, permit me to go into details
here. Instead, I will focus my comments on Williston's role in establishing the
Restatement's greatest doctrinal innovation, the doctrine of promissory
estoppel.7
Promissory estoppel is the great exception to the consideration, or
bargain, requirement in American contract law. As a general matter, courts
enforce only those promises that are the products of bargains. They do not
enforce gratuitous promises-promises to confer a gift, for example. Classical
contract theory explained this as a matter of formal logic: gifts do not result
from bargains, and, therefore, gift promises cannot be enforced. Under the
doctrine of promissory estoppel, however, courts do enforce gratuitous
promises that have caused foreseeable and detrimental reliance on the part of
promisees. According to the version of the doctrine contained in section 90
of the Restatement, "[a] promise which the promisor should reasonably expect
to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the
part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is
binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise."8
Contracts scholars know well the standard account of promissory
estoppel's appearance in the Restatement. In this account, popularized by
Grant Gilmore in The Death of Contract, Williston reluctantly agreed to
section 90 only after Corbin embarrassed him by pointing out several cases
that had relied on promissory estoppel. 9 Not to put too fine a point on it, this
account is flatly wrong. Nobody had to shame Williston into accepting
promissory estoppel. On the contrary, he repeatedly claimed credit for
inventing the doctrine and for making it a success. He defended the doctrine
against its detractors in the ALl.
Williston endorsed promissory estoppel only gradually. He toyed with
the concept in his 1920 contracts treatise, but ultimately concluded that the
weight of case law opposed it.'° By the time he became Reporter, though, he
enthusiastically embraced the doctrine. Williston came to believe that real
6. Mark L. Movsesian, Rediscovering Williston, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 207 (2005).
7. See id. at 247-53 (discussing this pont in more detail).
8. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932).
9. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 61-65 (1974).
10. See I SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 139 (1920).
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world concerns about rough justice and business convenience required the
exception to the bargain requirement. As he explained during the ALI debate
on section 90,
As someone expressed it, in regard to this section, if you bind up too closely,
with definite mathematical rules the law of consideration, the boiler will
burst. You have got to leave the court a certain leeway outside of those
mathematical and exact rules. This section is, so to speak, the safety valve
for the subject of consideration."
Williston did not advocate abolishing the consideration requirement, of
course. Section 90 was fairly narrow; only foreseeable, "definite and
substantial" reliance, not reliance alone, could make a promise binding. And
he insisted that the full expectation measure of damages should be available
as a remedy for breach, a position that many-including, famously, Fuller and
Perdue-have seen as excessively rigid.'2 These facts should not distract us
from the larger point, though. Williston did not oppose the central reform of
the Restatement. He championed it.
My observations here do not detract from Professor Hull's ultimate point
about the reform agenda of many of the scholars who engineered the creation
of the ALI. I do hope, though, that I have provided a helpful qualification to
her work. At least with respect to the contracts Restatement, the reformers did
not need to work around a recalcitrant Reporter. Notwithstanding the myth
that later Realists like Gilmore created, Williston was, in fact, the
progressives' ally.
11. Movsesian, supra note 6, at 249 (quoting Proceedings at Fourth Annual Meeting, 4 A.L.I. PROC. APP.
86 (1926) (discussing section 88, the predecessor of section 90)).
12. See L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: pts. I & 2,46
YALE L.J. 52, 64-65 (1936), 46 YALE L.J. 373, 401, 405-06, 413 (1937).
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